Can We Really Trust Iran with Nukes?
I would like to draw attention to another old favorite, Thomas P.M. Barnett. With his recent post, Same Old in Iran, addresses one of the more vexing foreign policy problems on the American to-do list in the foreseeable future.
Historically, Barnett seems to me quite clearly correct on his big picture assessment of the Gap and Core, as well as how America needs to move forward in the globalizing world. But my goodness, he seems to gloss over the very serious problem presented by Islam. And Iran.
The good from his post? Check this out:
With any revolutionary state, the original leadership generation ages out, usually without grace and with plenty of regrets. They see what could have been and what it's turned out to be. They look back over past decisions, and realize they would have done things differently if given the chance again to rule. They typically split across two impulses: 1) they should have been more stringent re: the revolution; and 2) they should have moved more decisively to normalize the revolution's relationship with the outside world.
Seems right on the money to me. As far as it goes.
The bad? Primarily, I remain puzzled by Tom's remarkable refusal to see any uniqueness with the Islamic angle to the nuclear question . His co-hort, Sean Meade, took issue with a commenter who raised the issue of Barnett's apparent reliance on hope in his assessment of Iran's present situation playing out according to historical form. However, the guy seemed right to me.
Barnett's post is a great post, especially if -- if -- the uniqueness of Islam does not have a fundamental effect on the situation. But Barnett's point of view is maddening precisely because his position essentially does reduce down to a hope that the presumed "same ole, same ole" demonstrated by the historical record is in fact an accurate assessment. Revolutionary movements splintering in later generations as ideologues and technocrats split into opposing camps and competing for control.
Okay. Maybe.
Sean, in his comment taking the commenter to task, made a historical comparison on the question of nukes by linking Mao, to Khruschev, to the Israelis -- and all of them to the Pakistanis and the Iranians. His point was that none of the listed leaders or their countries have used their nuclear arsenal and neither will the Iranians.
Now, how can that be something other than hope?
Forgive me but there seems to be (amidst all of the gratuitous assumptions of so many supposing neo-con arrogance) something of an even greater arrogance in refusing to acknowledge the possibility if not probability that the Ahmadinejad crew in Iran may win out -- for decades and decades.
Not to mention the very real possibility that the crazies in Pakistan may prevail as well, especially via renegades in the ISI. I generally find great value in Tom's approach and he rarely fails to be interesting but he appears far, far too sanguine on this.
Islam is absolutely, positively unique. I don't demonize that religion, I'm well aware of Indonesian model, etc. But we need to first and foremost acknowledge this uniqueness and the very real challenge it presents. On this issue especially, past performance on the world stage is no guarantee of future results with Islamic nations.
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